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This paper analyzes the impact of heterogeneous (social) preferences on the 
weighting and combination of incentive performance measures as well as on a firm’s 
profitability within a principal-agent framework. Previous literature had failed to 
recognize heterogeneity effects. We consider rivalry, pure self-interest and altruism 
as extreme forms of such preferences within the spectrum of possible alternatives, 
and show that firm profits are maximized when differentiation among agents is 
maximized with respect to individual (social) preferences. In order to realize these 
gains in profitability, it is necessary that a firm directs principals to reallocate 
participation in performance measures so that competitive agents are privileged over 
altruistic agents. By modeling the need to incorporate heterogeneity of agents we 
provide insights that differences in social preferences can be managed to improve 
wage compensation and other business administration deliberations within a 
decentralized firm. 
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1. Introduction 
If we try to define the concept of ‘firm’ as simply as possible, we could say that firms 
are structures where several people work together in order to achieve common 
goals. Humans are social beings, and as such they may care, or not care, for one 
another and inevitably bring with them differences in views and tastes. With that in 
mind, it is clear that not all employees get along with each other equally well, 
especially in places where interaction is frequent and personal, such as firms. Some 
employees are more productive in certain environments than in others. This is partly 
a result of the motivational skills of direct leaders; however, differences in personal 
social preferences also seem to have a major influence on employee productivity.  
Using a principal-agent framework within a decentralized organization two 
questions are examined: (1) what factors determine the impact that differences in 
social preferences have on profitability? (2) How can we compose a group of workers 
optimally in order to guarantee the best possible performance from a superordinate’s 
point of view? To answer these questions, we will first show how a principal reacts to 
his or her agents’ homogeneous and heterogeneous social preferences of varying 
strength when incentives are provided. Following that, we will present formally 
derived statements about the consequences of social preferences on firm 
profitability. 
Previous works have failed to recognize the heterogeneity of agents in their 
analyses. When studying organizational behavior, economics experts have so far 
typically concentrated on analyzing the structure of the optimal reward system under 
the assumption that employees behave in a purely selfish manner.1 Since those 
studies do not consider differences in preferences, it has been difficult to draw 
conclusions about the best way of composing a team. However, studies from 
different fields within the behavioral sciences like psychology2, neuroscience3 and 
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experimental decision theory4 suggest that, in many cases, the economic decisions 
that individuals make are also determined by social preferences such as altruism, 
inequity aversion and reciprocity.5 
Generally, preferences are designated as social “if a person not only cares 
about the material resources allocated to her but also cares about the material 
resources allocated to relevant reference agents.”6 On the basis of this definition, 
various types of motivational structures are distinguished in the economics literature,7 
the main criterion being the effect that changes in another person’s payoff has on the 
individual’s own utility. In this paper, our theoretical framework does not permit us to 
analyze all relevant types of preferences. We have chosen to focus on pure self-
interest, rivalry and altruism, although reciprocity and inequity aversion are also 
examined to some extent in the previous literature, especially in the context of 
experimental decision theory. An important reason for our choice is that we are 
interested in the possible effects of differences between the preferences of several 
agents on the principal’s provision of incentives and on firm profitability. Therefore, 
social preferences that aim at a minimum of differences e.g. in wages, like reciprocity 
and inequity aversion, cannot be a suitable starting point for such an investigation. By 
contrast, rivalry, pure self-interest and altruism represent three types of preferences 
within the spectrum of possible types, where at the one extreme, in the case of 
rivalry, the other agent’s payoff is always evaluated negatively, and at the other 
extreme, in the case of altruism, it is always evaluated positively, independently of 
the overall distribution of wages. 
Focusing on those three types allows us to draw intuitive conclusions about 
the either complementary or contradictory relation between a principal’s 
counteractions (necessary for exploiting each of his or her single agents’ social 
preferences) and, as a consequence, about the impact that such measures have on 
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firm profitability. Furthermore, in reality, rivalry seems to play an important role in 
many business areas, as can be seen from the ongoing discussion on wage justice in 
Germany8 as well as in Northern America9, but also in other fields of interest such as 
sports. Altruism, however, has also been shown to have a strong effect on human 
behavior under various circumstances.10 
As we will see below, rivalry and altruism can be modeled in comparable 
terms,11 each time including pure self-interest as a limit in case we take the particular 
social preference parameters in our mathematical formulations to zero. This enables 
us to employ the same analytical framework for studying differences in intensity 
among homogeneous as well as among heterogeneous types of (social) preferences. 
Therefore, in this paper we analyze one formal class of comparable preferences, of 
which three extreme types have been included. By contrast, preferences like 
reciprocity and inequity aversion, which are based on fairness, would require a 
different modeling approach. 
Our results highlight the importance of variety in the agents’ motivational 
structures. In the following, we will show that a principal can use this variety to 
increase his or her own profits. As a prerequisite, he or she must shift the weightings 
of performance measures between agents in a way that the (more) competitive agent 
gains at the expense of the other agent. This scheme can be seen as an optimal way 
of reacting to the agents’ social preferences. If the monetarily discriminated agent 
views such measures as positive, this translates into higher profits for the firm, i.e. 
the less “disadvantaged” agents see the consequences of such measures as 
negative, the higher the firm’s profits, which implies that principals can often make 
use of differences in motivational structures, but cannot profit from equally strong 
homogeneous social preferences. This contradicts the common intuition that altruistic 
agents, who do not begrudge others their prosperity, make the largest contributions, 
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and are therefore the most important members of a team. Instead, as will become 
evident, competitive persons are equally significant as part of a mixture of different 
characters. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates our work 
to previous research in the field. Section 3 outlines the framework of our analysis and 
describes the theoretical model we use here with its basic assumptions. Sections 4 
and 5 contain our main results. First, the consequences of taking into account 
different social preferences when designing the structure of the optimal wage 
compensation system are examined in Section 4. Then, on the basis of our results, in 
Section 5 we consider the impact of heterogeneous (social) preferences on firm 
profitability. Section 6 explores the implications of our theoretical analysis and 
highlights opportunities for further research. 
2. Relation to the Literature 
Previous research on social preferences in principal-agent models distinguishes 
between models that concentrate on vertical comparisons of an agent with his or her 
principal12 and models that concentrate on horizontal comparisons between agents 
on the same horizontal layer.13 In the latter case, authors usually focus on the optimal 
design of the wage compensation system.14 The question of whether the principal 
can make use of his or her agents’ social preferences is explicitly addressed in only a 
few papers, which do not offer clear-cut results. 
Rey Biel (2007) examines the impact of inequity aversion and shows that in a 
situation of team production without any uncertainty, welfare comparisons between 
agents have an intrinsic motivation effect on individual efforts. Itoh (2004) confirms 
these results and generalizes them to include competitive preferences in a model 
which incorporates uncertainty but neglects technological dependences. He draws 
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the conclusion that social preferences among agents on the same hierarchical layer 
are generally beneficial from a firm’s point of view. Both papers impose limited 
liability constraints. In this spirit, Bartling and von Siemens (2006) claim that among 
employees, envy can only have a cost-reducing effect in cases of limited liability.  
By contrast, Dierkes and Harreiter (2006) show that a principal can make use 
of his or her agents’ rivalry also in cases where there is no limited liability; however, 
Bartling and von Siemens (2005, 2006) point out that in such cases, envy and a 
preference for inequity aversion may increase agency costs and thus harm a firm’s 
profits. Neilson and Stowe (2008) suggest that, despite an intrinsic motivation effect, 
in cases where inequity-averse agents are concerned, the principal’s inequity 
premium increases with the inequity aversion of his or her agents.15 Similarly, 
Demougin, Fluet and Helm (2006) deduce that in a two-task environment, where only 
one agent’s efforts are observable, inequity aversion unambiguously decreases total 
output and hence labor productivity, although their model includes the limited liability 
constraints.  
As this brief overview shows, the available literature offers no clear 
understanding of how different social preferences impact profitability. What’s more, 
all cited papers take for granted that agents do not differ with respect to types of 
(social) preferences while the issue of altruism is not adequately discussed. In actual 
business life, however, it is more realistic to assume that the members of a team may 
have different behavioral traits. In our study, we shall try to provide a thorough 
understanding of the factors that determine the impact of diverse types of social 
preferences on profitability. To achieve this, the underlying theoretical framework 
must allow the explicit computation of utilities and, therefore, a precise solution. 
Previously developed analytical models are often formulated in a very general 
manner and hence cannot be solved for the principal’s decision parameters that 
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specify his or her contract offer16 or only allow remuneration to be assessed in 
dependence of discrete outcomes that are affected by agents’ discrete efforts as well 
as by which discrete and stochastic external conditions apply.17 In the latter case, the 
explicit calculation of utility values is in fact possible, but only under additional 
restrictive assumptions, such as that agents have identical (social) preferences.18 
Therefore, we employ an exactly solvable principal-multiagent linear-exponential-
normal (LEN) model19 and extend it by incorporating heterogeneous social 
preferences. 
Concerning the optimal provision of incentives, earlier studies have shown that 
preferences for inequity aversion (Itoh 2004; Bartling and von Siemens 2005) as well 
as envy or rivalry (Bartling and von Siemens 2006; Dierkes and Harreiter 2006) lead 
principals to provide their agents with more equitable, so-called “flat wage” contracts. 
Itoh (2004) also compares the advantages of team-based compensation and relative 
performance evaluation under the assumption that agents have identical (social) 
preferences. Although this is not our primary objective, in our paper we explore this 
point further, by investigating how to weight and combine performance measures in 
the presence of various social preferences as well as stochastic dependences.20 In 
contrast to most existing studies,21 we also allow for differences in the agents’ other 
personality traits, apart from their motivational structures.22 By doing so, we are able 
to deliver new, in-depth insights into the overlapping functions of the principal’s share 
rates, as well as into their motivational potential. 
3. The Model 
Conceptual Framework of Analysis 
The impact of social preferences on the optimal structure of the principal’s system of 
incentives and firm profits may depend on both external and internal determinants. 
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Organizational and environmental conditions, as well as conditions of production, are 
of particular importance. The relevance of organizational conditions derives from the 
assumption that agents belong to different decentralized divisions. Within a firm, 
arguably an employee’s most important connections to his or her superior follow a 
vertical direction, while those to his or her colleagues on the same hierarchical level 
follow a horizontal direction (see Figure 1). Both types of relationships may impact an 
employee’s performance. In this paper, we are mainly interested in how the 
heterogeneous preferences among agents affect firm performance, so we will only 
consider the psychological interdependences between pairs of horizontally aligned 
agents on the same hierarchical layer. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Figure 1: Directions of psychological relationships as a result of social preferences 
Technological dependences in the production process arise if an agent’s 
performance measure is affected not only by his or her own activities, but also by 
those of agents in other decentralized divisions (and vice versa). Environmental 
stochastic dependences are present if the profits of two decentralized divisions 
depend on correlated error terms. For example, such correlations can result from 
external market conditions or the general business cycle. Therefore, the influences of 
different preferences in a decentralized organization can be analyzed in cases of 
internal technological and/or external stochastic dependence as well as 
independence (see Figure 2). 
Insert Figure 2 here 
Figure 2: Determinants of the research problem 
Space does not allow us to explore fully the influence of technological production 
dependences, so in this paper we shall focus on the interrelation between stochastic 
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and psychological dependences.23 However, elsewhere it has been shown that our 
main results about the impact of social preferences on firm profitability hold also in 
the case of technological dependences.24 
The structure and impact of preference interdependences are closely linked to 
an agent’s personal traits. Social preferences typically concern one or several other 
persons. In our model we will consider pairs of agents on the same hierarchical level 
(Figure 1). The two agents may have competitive, selfish or altruistic preferences. 
Thus, three homogeneous and six heterogeneous combinations can be obtained in 
all (see Figure 3). 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Figure 3: Combinations of preferences 
To elucidate the issue, we will begin by formulating the utility functions of the agents 
and calculating the optimal incentive system of the principal in the extreme cases of 
two-sided rivalry (RR) as well as two-sided altruism (AA). We will then proceed to 
examine and interpret in greater detail the impact of different types of social 
preferences exhibited by agents on the profit share rates, as established by the 
principal, as well as on the profitability of the firm in various scenarios. In our 
analysis, we will pay particular attention to the distinction between one-sided (RE or 
ER and AE or EA) and two-sided homogeneous (RR and AA) social preferences. 
These combinations will be considered separately, taking into account that the 
strength of both agents’ social preferences can vary. After that, we will look into the 
case of two-sided heterogeneous social preferences (RA or AR). This approach 
enables us to draw fresh conclusions about the optimal composition of a team and 
the influence that large differences between the preferences of its members can have 
on firm profitability. 
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Prerequisites and Structure of the Basic Analytical Model  
To analyze the impact of diverse preferences, we assume a LEN model with one 
principal P and two agents i  ( BAi ,= ), each of whom leads his or her own 
decentralized division. The profits ix  of the two decentralized divisions, which 
depend on the agents’ non-observable efforts a  and b  as well as on the error terms 
iε , which represent stochastic environmental influences, add up to the firm profits, 
denoted by x . Therefore, the profit functions based on (isolated) production functions 
are: 
 BBAA bx;ax εε +=+= . (1) 
The error terms are normally distributed with a mean of zero, variance 2iσ  and 
correlation coefficient ρ . In this paper no technological dependences between the 
two decentralized divisions are assumed. The agents’ efforts cause non-monetary 
quadratic disutility iV , given by  
 
22
2
1
;
2
1 bcVacV BBAA == , (2) 
where the individual coefficients ic  allow for unequal marginal costs. Both agents are 
offered linear contracts, where the total amount of wage compensation iS  comprises 
a fixed payment 0α  ( 0β ) as well as a proportional fraction in the profits of each of the 
two decentralized divisions, which are determined by share rates Aα , Bα  and Aβ , Bβ : 
 BBAABBBAAA xxSxxS βββααα ++=++= 00 ; . (3) 
The principal optimizes his or her objective function with respect to the wage 
compensation coefficients in (3). Depending on the endogenously determined values 
of Bα  and Aβ  three different compensation schemes may develop: (a) individual 
compensation for 0=Bα  ( 0=Aβ ), (b) relative performance evaluation for 0<Bα  
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( 0<Aβ ) and (c) team-based compensation for 0>Bα  ( 0>Aβ ). The principal and the 
agents have exponential utility functions. Since the principal is assumed to be risk-
neutral, he or she maximizes the expected value of his or her residuum after wage 
payments: 
 
( ) ( ) 0011 βαβαβα −−−−+−−= BBBAAAP xxU . (4) 
Both agents are presumed to be strictly risk-averse. The strength of their risk 
aversion is measured by the constant coefficients 0>Ar  and 0>Br , where higher 
values of ir  imply a higher degree of risk aversion. 
Three types of preferences are taken into account: pure self-interest, rivalry 
and altruism. Agents who are driven by pure self-interest consider only their own 
material needs when choosing effort levels a  and b , whereas competitive and 
altruistic agents also consider the effects of their decisions on the financial welfare of 
another agent. In the following analysis, it is assumed that social preferences refer 
only to the agents’ remuneration and do not include parameters that are harder to 
observe such as costs of effort. By means of BAjiSS ji ,,;, =  and ji ≠ , we therefore 
define: 
 
         ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )⋅−⋅−⋅=⋅⋅ ijiiijii SSlkSSSF ,  for rivalry (5) 
and 
  
 
     ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )⋅+⋅=⋅⋅ jiiijii SnSmSSG ,  for altruism. (6) 
Since both types of social preferences can vary in strength, the above specifications 
represent a continuum of different behavioral types, each of which includes pure 
self-interest as a special case for either 0=ik  or 0=in  and 1=im : 
 
    ( ) ( )( ) ( )⋅=⋅⋅ ijii SSSH , . (7) 
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In the case of rivalry, the social preference term ( ) ( )( )⋅−⋅ ijii SSlk  in equation (5) for 
agent i  compares the other agent j ’s realized remuneration with agent i ’s own 
reward. If the resulting value is positive, agent i  feels disadvantaged and suffers a 
disutility (envy). Therefore, the principal has to heighten agent i ’s wage payments if 
he or she wants that agent to cooperate. On the other hand, if the result has a 
negative value, agent i  perceives the other agent as being at a disadvantage, and 
draws additional utility from such a situation. This may be interpreted as 
“schadenfreude”, so to speak, but also as pride in personal achievements. 
Consequently agent i  accepts lower remuneration, which suggests that he or she 
works harder for unchanged incentives. The social preference parameter ik  ( 0≥ik ) 
in formula (5) measures the strength of an agent’s rivalry and can take different 
values for each agent. Higher values indicate a stronger rivalry. The parameter il  
measures agent i ’s aspiration level. It defines the ratio of the agents’ remuneration 
ji SS  for which the effect of his or her social preference changes from utility-
reducing to utility-enhancing. For 1=il , agent i  is envious and suffers a disutility if he 
or she earns less than j . If the rewards of agent i  exceed those of j , that agent 
feels more satisfied after evaluating his or her remuneration with relation to that of his 
or her peer. This evaluation regards utility gains, which are compared to the utility 
that agent would receive in case of purely selfish behavior. For values of 1>il , there 
exist allocations of rewards where agent i  is not satisfied with his or her own 
remuneration although agent i  earns more than j . In this case, this indicates that 
agent i  does not accept that agent j  should receive even a smaller reward (one 
might say, that agent i  begrudges agent j ’s reward). However, values of 1<il  
indicate that agent i  may be gleeful or proud evaluating his rewards relative to those 
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of the other agent although he or she earns less than j , which appears implausible. 
Therefore, we restrict the co-domain of il  to the interval [ ]∞∈ ;1il . 
Unlike rivalry, which is considered above, altruism, as described by the 
formula given in equation (6), suggests that an agent is content when the other agent 
receives a greater monetary reward. This results in a willingness to exert more effort 
even when the first agent’s own remuneration remains unchanged. The utility 
function is strictly increasing in both agents’ wage compensations iS  and jS . The 
weighting factor 10 ≤≤ im  indicates that when an agent attaches greater weight to 
the other agent’s remuneration through 0≥in  the subjective importance of the first 
agent’s own reward can decrease. Therefore, in equation (6) both agents strive to 
maximize the weighted sum of monetary payoffs. For each agent, the wage 
payments iS  and jS  are perfect substitutes.25 Using the general specification (6), we 
can differentiate special cases of altruism for 
 
1== ji mm  (8a) 
as well as 
 
1=+ ii nm  (8b) 
For the latter, the social preference term in (6) can be rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ).1 ⋅−⋅+⋅=⋅+⋅−=⋅ ijiijiiii SSnSSnSnG 26 (9) 
Edgeworth (1881) calls the relation of weighting factors 
i
i
m
n
 and 
i
i
n
n
−1
 “coefficients of 
effective sympathy.” They can be interpreted as measures for the strength of 
altruism. When 1<
i
i
m
n
 ( 1
1
<
− i
i
n
n ), one agent wishes that the other agent receives 
high remuneration, but still values his or her own rewards more. For 1>
i
i
m
n
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( 1
1
>
− i
i
n
n ), however, the first agent is even willing to forgo part of his or her own 
remuneration if the other agent receives more instead. This form of altruism can also 
be called selfless behavior. The main difference between specifications (8a) and (8b) 
lies in a shift of the reference point. In the case of (8a), selfless behavior begins at 
1== ii mn , whereas in the case of (8b), it begins at 5.0=in . 
The formulas that express different types of social preferences given in 
equations (5) and (6) are identical if the mathematical relations 
 iiiii nlkmk =−=+ ;1  (10) 
hold. This formal equivalence allows us to compare utility values and derive certain 
implications concerning the optimal composition of teams. For the sake of simplicity, 
here we concentrate on clarifying the procedure that yields an optimal solution, 
mainly for cases of rivalry. Using equation (10), one can deduce the corresponding 
results for altruism and heterogeneous social preferences without further calculation. 
4. Structure of the Optimal Incentive System 
Given the stated assumptions, the agents’ utility functions can be written using 
certainty equivalent notation. In the case of rivalry, one finds that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⋅−⋅⋅+−⋅−⋅−⋅⋅+= jiiiiiijiiiii SlkSkVarrVSlkSkECE 121 . (11) 
Similarly, in the case of altruism we find that: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⋅+⋅−⋅−⋅+⋅= jiiiiijiiii SnSmVarrVSnSmECE 2 . (12) 
In either situation, both agents choose effort levels a  and b  in order to maximize 
their certainty equivalents (11) or (12), which, using equations (1), (2) and (3), can 
also be written as (the example refers to agent A in cases of rivalry): 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )[ ]{
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] }.1121
1
22
1
111max
22
222
00
ρσσβαβασβα
σβαββ
βααα
BABAAABAAAAABBAAAB
AAAAAA
A
ABAAAAA
AABAAAAA
a
lkklkklkk
lkkracblkalk
lkbkakkCE
−+⋅−+⋅+−+
+−+⋅−−−
−−+++++=
 
(13) 
The principal anticipates this behavior and restricts the optimization problem through 
the so-called incentive compatibility constraints. The corresponding reaction 
functions of the agents in the case of two-sided rivalry ( RR ) are: 
 
( ) ( )





 −+
=





 −+
= 0;
c
lkk1
maxb;0;
c
lkk1
maxa
B
BBBBB
A
AAAAA αββα
 (14) 
while for two-sided altruism ( AA), they are: 
 





 +
=





 +
= 0;max;0;max
B
BBBB
A
AAAA
c
nmb
c
nm
a
αββα
. (15) 
The principal further has to consider the participation constraints, which suggest that 
each agent has to receive at least his or her reservation utility, normalized to zero in 
our model. Given these limitations, the principal maximizes his or her utility function 
(4), which for two-sided rivalry can also be written as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,11
11
00 βααββα
βαβα
−−





 −+
−−
+





 −+
−−=
B
BBBBB
BB
A
AAAAA
AAP
c
lkk
c
lkk
U
 
(16) 
over the wage compensation parameters BABA βββααα ,,,,, 00 . Performing the 
typical optimization steps yields:27 
 11 11
1 Q
lkk
lkP
lkk
k
AAA
AA
BBB
B
A ⋅
++
+⋅
++
+
=α
 
(17) 
 22 11
1 Q
lkk
lkP
lkk
k
AAA
AA
BBB
B
B ⋅
++
+⋅
++
+
=α
 
(18) 
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11 11
1 P
lkk
lkQ
lkk
k
BBB
BB
AAA
A
A ⋅
++
+⋅
++
+
=β  (19) 
 
22 11
1 P
lkk
lkQ
lkk
k
BBB
BB
AAA
A
B ⋅
++
+⋅
++
+
=β  (20) 
with 
 ( ) A22AA1 c1r1
1P
ρσ −+
=    ;   ( ) ρσ
σ
ρσ B
A
A
22
AA
2
c1r1
1P ⋅
−+
−=  (21) 
 
   ( ) B22BB2 c1r1
1Q
ρσ −+
=    ;   ( ) ρσ
σ
ρσ A
B
B
22
BB
1
c1r1
1Q ⋅
−+
−=  (22) 
The corresponding results for altruism and heterogeneous social preferences are 
obtained by applying the formal relations given in equation (10). From the reference 
case of purely selfish behavior, we know that an agent’s wages are lower for higher 
values of his or her counterpart’s performance measure. This so-called “relative 
performance evaluation” is useful in the presence of stochastic dependences 
because it enables us to filter out the risks that can be traced back to common 
occurrences that lie outside the agents’ responsibilities and affect their remuneration 
equally (Holmström 1982). When social preferences are introduced, it can be seen 
from equations (17) through to (20) that the principal reacts to the agents’ 
comparisons of remuneration by reallocating their variable wage compensation 
components through shifting the shares in performance measures that each agent 
receives, where Aα  and Aβ  as well as Bα  and Bβ  are interdependent. The 
weightings of performance measures are differentially divided between the two 
agents according to the type(s) of social preferences, which can cause major 
changes in the optimal design of the incentive system.28 In order to clarify that 
argument, we shall analyze separately the cases of one- and two-sided social 
preferences. 
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4.1. Profit Share Rates in Cases of One-Sided Rivalry 
Impact of Rivalry on the Agents’ Shares in A’s Profits  
For the analysis of one-sided rivalry we assume that agent A behaves competitively 
while agent B is completely selfish ( 0;0: => BA kkRE ). The optimal expressions for 
share rates Aα  and Aβ  in equations (17) and (19) can be reduced to: 
 ( ) 1AAA
AA
A
22
AA
A Qlkk1
lk
c1r1
1
⋅
++
+
−+
=
ρσ
α  (23) 
 
11
1 Q
lkk
k
AAA
A
A ⋅
++
+
=β , (24) 
where 01 <Q . Thus, Aβ  in equation (24) simultaneously fulfills two complementary 
functions. It serves 
• as an insurance parameter that reduces the wage compensation risk for agent 
B, and 
• as a source of intrinsic motivation for competitive agent A. 
Considering agent A’s reaction function in equation (14), one can observe that 
negative values of Aβ  have a performance-enhancing effect for that agent. This is 
due to a reduction in agent B’s wage compensation, which leads to greater rivalry 
and thus higher motivation for A. The increased effort that A makes as a result leads 
to an increase in the cost of effort. Thus, the principal must reduce A’s direct 
incentive intensity by reducing Aα . In turn, this also reduces the relevant wage 
compensation risk for agent A. Accordingly, equation (23) can be written as: 
 ( ) AA
AA
A
22
AA
A k1
lk
c1r1
1 β
ρσ
α ⋅
+
+
−+
=      ,     0<Aβ . (25) 
At the same time, because 0<Aβ  as an insurance parameter for agent B no longer 
has only a risk-reducing effect when taking rivalry into account ( RE
 
or
 
RR ), the 
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absolute value of Aβ  becomes lower, compared to the reference point of purely 
selfish behavior: 
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When we consider the terms in bold in equation (26),29 it becomes obvious that 
0<Aβ  on the one side may reduce the risk carried by agent B, but at the same time 
has a risk-increasing effect for agent A. The latter is more pronounced for 
increasingly negative Aβ  values. Less negative values of Aβ  reduce the risk for 
agent A. Consequently, when determining Aβ , it is necessary for the principal to 
trade off between optimal incentive intensity on one side and optimal risk-sharing on 
the other. The difference from the reference case of completely selfish agents is that, 
in this case ( RE ), this necessity arises only indirectly as a result of agent A’s social 
preferences. As a consequence, the absolute value of negative Aβ  shrinks as the 
values of the social preference parameter Ak , as well as of the aspiration level Al , 
rise, while the positive values of Aα  are simultaneously reduced. 
Impact of Rivalry on the Agents’ Shares in B’s Profits  
Again, assuming 0;0: => BA kkRE , the optimal expressions for share rates Bα  and 
Bβ  in equations (18) and (20) become: 
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Unlike in the previous analysis concerning Aβ , here when the principal determines 
Bα  he or she needs to trade off two opposite effects: 
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• filtering out risks in the incentive system of agent A, and 
• reducing the possible negative consequences caused by agent A’s rivalry. 
From previous agency models, it is known that stochastic dependences further the 
use of relative performance evaluation, which yields negative values for Bα , while 
agent A’s rivalry has the opposite effect by enhancing the application of team-based 
compensation. Thus, when both forms of interdependences occur at the same time it 
should be determined which of these two basic types of compensation will be 
favored. Figure 4 illustrates the range of values for share rate Bα  as a function of the 
strength of A’s rivalry Ak 30 on one side, and the strength of the stochastic 
dependence ρ  on the other.31 The graph reveals that the horizontally drawn zero 
plane and the curved Bα  surface intersect for every value of A’s rivalry Ak . 
Consequently, for every strength of A’s rivalry Ak , there is a threshold value ( )Ak*ρ  
where agent A’s share rate Bα  switches signs. The intersecting line ( )Ak*ρ  is strictly 
increasing and concave, meaning that the correlation’s threshold value ( )Ak*ρ  rises 
as the influence of rivalry Ak  increases. The analysis makes clear that higher values 
of ρ  augment the merits of relative performance evaluation, while team-based pay 
becomes more favorable when agent A’s rivalry is more strongly developed. If 
( )Ak*ρρ < , the random variation of both agents’ performance measures is affected 
only slightly by common events. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Figure 4: Range of values for Bα , dependent on the correlation coefficient ρ  as well as the strength 
of rivalry Ak . 
Thus, relative performance evaluation is not a very powerful means of reducing the 
risk carried by agent A. In addition to the comparatively small risk-reduction potential 
for 0<Bα , increasing Bα  above zero enables the principal to ensure that agent A will 
always benefit when higher wage payments are granted to agent B.32 This measure, 
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which arises from A’s rivalry, increases this agent’s utility and therefore leads to 
higher firm profits. As a consequence, the principal implements a team-based wage 
compensation scheme. However, if the threshold value of the correlation coefficient 
( )Ak*ρ  is exceeded, the positive risk-reducing effects are greater than the potentially 
negative consequences of rivalry, and thus relative performance evaluation becomes 
advantageous. 
As a last result of agent A’s rivalry, and of the consequential reallocations of 
the agents’ variable wage compensation components as incentives, the principal 
lowers incentive intensity Bβ  of agent B. Accordingly, the sum of Bβ  in equation (28) 
and the second summand of the mathematical expression for Bα  in equation (27) are 
identical to agent B’s incentive intensity in the case of purely selfish behavior. 
4.2. Profit Share Rates in the Case of One-Sided Altruism 
Impact of Altruism on the Agents’ Shares in A’s Profits 
The analysis in cases of one-sided altruism, which is characterized by one altruistic 
and one selfish agent ( AE ), suggests that there are many analogies between one-
sided altruism ( AE ) and one-sided rivalry ( RE ). In the following, we shall point out 
the major differences between these two cases ( AE
 
and RE ) that arise in the 
interpretation of our results. Here too, share rate Aβ  simultaneously fulfills the same 
two functions as in the situation of rivalry (i.e. as an insurance parameter that 
reduces the wage compensation risk for agent B, and as a source of intrinsic 
motivation for the competitive agent A). However, in the case of one-sided altruism, 
the effects of Aβ
 
work in the opposite direction: negative values of Aβ  reduce the risk 
for agent B, but at the same time, these values lower the intrinsic motivation of agent 
A.33 To see why this is the case, we shall turn to the definition of altruism introduced 
further up: this type of social preference characteristically includes the willingness to 
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bear a personal cost for actions that increase the prosperity of another person. 
Therefore, positive values of Aβ  would translate into greater effort from altruistic 
agent A, as this is expected to lead both to higher rewards for agent A and better 
remuneration for agent B. 
The opposite applies when Aβ
 
takes negative values, as in our case, because 
in that case an increase in the effort of agent A will improve A’s financial rewards but 
reduce agent B’s expected income. Thus, altruism partly undermines the positive 
outcome of hard work for agent A, since, as a consequence of this social preference, 
that agent internalizes the negative external effect of his or her actions on B and 
therefore also suffers from their negative impact on B’s remuneration. This results in 
less willingness to bear the cost of personal effort, than in the situation of purely 
selfish behavior. As a countermeasure, the principal has to boost agent A’s explicit 
incentives by increasing Aα , otherwise A’s effort will fall short of the principal’s 
expectations. These observations are more noticeable at higher values of the 
“coefficient of effective sympathy” 
A
A
m
n
. 
Impact of Altruism on the Agents’ Shares in B’s Profits 
Agent A’s altruism leads to an increase in explicit incentives for agent B by increasing 
his or her variable wage compensation component Bβ . This is because the altruistic 
agent’s utility is positively affected by the other agent’s total remuneration, as a result 
of which the altruistic agent is willing to forgo his or her own financial reward. Thus, 
the altruistic agent’s variable wage payment can be reduced by decreasing Bα . 
Consequently, the mathematical relation 
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A
22
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B
m
n
c1r1
1 βρ
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−=      ,     0>Bβ  (29) 
holds. The principal’s scheme can be configured to subsidize the greater effort of the 
 - 21 - 
selfish agent by exploiting the other agent’s altruism. The resulting higher risk 
premiums are compensated through the fixed remuneration components. Reducing 
Am  from 1 and raising An  from 0 , i.e., increasing the “coefficient of effective 
sympathy” 
A
A
m
n
, amplifies the described effects, as can be seen from equation (29). 
In contrast to the rivalry situation, here Bα  is negative, even in the absence of social 
preferences. Therefore, there is no need for a trade-off between relative performance 
evaluation and team-based compensation. Both agents are rewarded relatively to 
one another, irrespective of the strength of agent A’s altruism and the degree to 
which the error terms in their performance measures are correlated. 
4.3. Combined Effects of Two-Sided Social Preferences 
If both agents take each other’s wage payments into account, their respective social 
preferences simultaneously affect all four share rates, which results in overlapping 
effects. Table 1 shows that a more developed sense of rivalry on the part of both 
agents ( RR) operates in the same direction for all four share rates.  
 Agent A Agent B 
 Aα  Bα  Aβ  Bβ  
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↑Ak  ↓  ↑  ↑  ↓  
↑Bk  ↓  ↑  ↑  ↓  
Table 1: Impact on share rates caused by a change in weighting for each agent’s rivalry 
This suggests that the agents’ direct incentive intensities Aα  and Bβ  are reduced 
when the social preferences of both are more developed. At the same time, each 
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agent’s shares in the other agent’s performance measure grow with an increase in 
the weighting of rivalry, which is represented by ↑Ak  and ↑Bk . Thus, the 
advantages of team-based compensation as compared to relative performance 
evaluation are further enhanced in a situation of two-sided rivalry. The impact of 
varying the intensity of both agents’ altruism ( AA) on the four share rates is depicted 
in Table 2. 
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↑AA mn  ↑  ↓  ↓  ↑  
↑BB mn  ↑  ↓  ↓  ↑  
Table 2: Impact on share rates caused by a change in weighting for each agent’s altruism 
It becomes apparent that both agents’ “coefficients of effective sympathy”, which are 
used as a measure of the strength of the altruism each agent exhibits, also operate in 
the same direction for all four share rates. Accordingly, the stronger each agent’s 
altruism becomes, the more that agent’s own performance measure counts in his or 
her own wage compensation system. This is because with increasing altruism, an 
agent attaches greater weight to the other agent’s remuneration than to his or her 
own personal reward in relative terms. By contrast, each agent’s share in the other’s 
performance measure is increasingly reduced as his or her “coefficient of effective 
sympathy” adopts higher values. Finally, the impact of varying heterogeneous social 
preferences, i.e., altruism for agent A and rivalry for agent B ( AR ), is shown in  
Table 3. 
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 Agent A Agent B 
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↑AA mn  ↑  ↓  ↓  ↑  
↑Bk  ↓  ↑  ↑  ↓  
Table 3: Impact on share rates caused by a change in weighting with regard to the agents’ 
heterogeneous social preferences 
In this case, both agents’ social preferences influence the values of all four share 
rates in opposite directions. Regardless of this, the altruistic agent A obtains a 
contract based on a relative performance evaluation. For the competitive agent B, 
however, again, it is necessary to trade off relative performance evaluation against 
team-based compensation. As in the cases of one- and two-sided rivalry discussed 
previously ( RE  and RR), here too Aβ  is positive (and consequently team-based 
compensation should be used) if the correlation coefficient falls below a threshold 
value 
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becomes optimal. The threshold value 
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agent B’s rivalry and for decreasing values of the “coefficient of effective sympathy” 
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 exhibited by agent A. Compared to the situation described in section 4.1, here 
the relation ( )BB
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

 ρρ ,  holds true, meaning that for the competitive agent 
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B, the benefits of relative performance evaluation increase in the case of 
heterogeneous social preferences, as compared to a situation of one-sided rivalry. 
5. The Influence of Social Preferences on the Profitability 
of the Firm 
This section examines the maximum attainable firm profits for all possible 
combinations of the different types of (social) preferences considered in our model. 
Our aim is to shed light on two interrelated issues. First, we will identify the conditions 
under which the principal can make use of the agents’ social preferences in each 
situation. Then, building on the results, we will turn to the central concern of our 
paper and broach the issue of the optimal combination of different types of (social) 
preferences for which firm profits are maximized. In this analysis, we assume that the 
principal optimally designs the wage compensation system according to the 
principles outlined above. Therefore, the maximum value of his or her objective 
function is calculated by assigning to the share rates in equation (16) their optimal 
values given in equations (17) to (22). This yields:34 
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For the sake of clarity, we first consider the case of one-sided social preferences RE  
and AE  in sections 5.1 and 5.2. We then go on to examine the optimal combinations 
in the case of two-sided homogeneous and heterogeneous social preferences in 
sections 5.3 ( RR  as well as AA) and 5.4 ( AR ). 
5.1. The Profitability of One-Sided Rivalry 
In the case of one-sided rivalry ( 0;0: => BA kkRE ) the optimal value of the objective 
function (30) reduces to: 
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The first term in (30) and (31) expresses the principal’s utility for agent A; the second 
term, the utility for agent B. Thus, agent A’s rivalry influences the principal’s 
economic prosperity in two ways. The first term is raised by the factor ( ) 11 >+ Ak , 
since agent A, because of his or her rivalry, is intrinsically motivated to distinguish 
himself or herself from agent B in terms of wage payments, which leads agent A to 
make a greater effort. For that reason, we call this effect, which is represented by the 
factor ( )Ak+1 , the intrinsic motivation effect. This has desirable consequences on the 
trade-off between efficient incentives and efficient risk-sharing from the firm’s point of 
view. However, the second term is reduced by the multiplier 1
1
1
<
++
+
AAA
A
lkk
k
. As is 
shown in section 4.1, the principal needs to reduce agent B’s participation in his or 
her own performance measure Bβ  in order to react optimally to agent A’s rivalry. The 
resulting lower incentive intensity for agent B causes that agent’s extrinsic motivation 
to decrease and therefore his or her effort to fall below the level identified in the 
reference case of purely selfish behavior. The principal’s welfare is therefore 
negatively affected by this so-called extrinsic motivation effect, which becomes more 
pronounced as the strength of rivalry Ak  and the aspiration level Al  take higher 
values. 
The total impact of agent A’s rivalry is determined by the question of which of 
the two effects described above dominates. However, to answer this question we 
have to consider not only the relative impact of the factors influenced by social 
preferences, but also the contributions that both agents would make in a situation of 
completely selfish behavior. Therefore, we differentiate between two cases in the 
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following analysis: in the first case, we assume that the agents are identical except 
for their basic types of (social) preferences. Figure 5 illustrates the optimal value of 
the principal’s objective function, subject to the strength of agent A’s rivalry as well as 
the strength of the stochastic dependence.35 
Insert Figure 5 here 
Figure 5: Impact of one-sided rivalry on firm profits when both agents are identical apart from their 
types of (social) preferences 
It becomes clear, then, that the principal benefits from agent A’s rivalry when the two 
agents are, apart from their social preferences, very similar in terms of their effort 
costs as well as their attitudes and exposure to risk.36 However, as indicated by 
Figure 6, which represents the second case,37 this need not be true if the self-
centered agent B is significantly more important to the principal in a situation of 
purely selfish behavior ( EE ). This could occur if, for example, agent A is much more 
risk averse ( BA rr >> ), has a more volatile performance measure ( BA σσ >> ), or suffers 
higher costs from comparable efforts ( BA cc >> ) than agent B. The correlation ρ  has 
no impact on the principal’s opportunity to profit from agent A’s rivalry (everything 
else being equal), since it influences equally the utility that can be extracted from 
both agents. All other parameters, exhibit threshold values which signify changes in 
the principal’s opportunity of benefiting from agent A’s rivalry.38  
The intuition for these formally derived results is as follows; If competitive 
agent A contributes to firm profits as much as or more than selfish agent B, then 
agent A’s ambition amplifies his or her effectiveness and so the corresponding 
reduction in incentive intensity for B is of comparably minor importance. 
Insert Figure 6 here 
Figure 6: Impact of one-sided rivalry on firm profits when greater importance is attached to selfish 
agent B than to competitive agent A 
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By contrast, if agent B is of greater importance to the superordinate’s goal, A’s am-
bition can prove detrimental to firm profit as, in that case, the principal is expected to 
privilege agent A over B in terms of shares in performance measure Bx , which would 
decrease the effort that the more capable agent B makes. Therefore, competitive 
behavior on the part of agents who make only small contributions to firm profits can 
have a negative effect, as this behavior requires the principal to pay those agents 
greater attention and discriminate against other high performers. The previous 
analysis leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 (Firm Profitability in the Case of One-Sided Rivalry): The principal 
profits from an agent’s rivalry if he or she chooses variable wage compensation 
components according to equations (17)–(22) (choice being an endogenous 
parameter) and if the exogenous conditions 
a) that the selfish agent’s contribution to his or her utility does not exceed by far 
the contribution of the competitive agent and  
b) that the competitive agent’s strength of rivalry does not fall below a critical value 
are fulfilled. In this case, the principal profits more from stronger rivalry.39 One-sided 
rivalry necessarily proves detrimental to the principal if both exogenous conditions 
are simultaneously not fulfilled. 
Finally, Figure 5 also illustrates that the interrelationship between firm profits and the 
strength of agent A’s rivalry is asymptotically linear, beginning with small values of 
Ak . As a consequence, its marginal impact is approximately constant. Furthermore, 
the slope of all curves ( )AP kU ∗  grows with increasing values for the correlation 
coefficient ρ , meaning that the principal profits more from agent A’s rivalry when the 
stochastic dependence is stronger. This is caused by higher-order effects, which 
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arise from the multiplicative composition of both profit-enhancing effects (risk 
reduction through higher ρ  and benefits caused by A’s rivalry) in the principal’s 
objective function. From an economic point of view, this result can be traced back to 
the complementarity of the functions described in section 4. 
5.2. The Profitability of One-Sided Altruism 
In general, altruism is usually perceived as a positive trait, since it involves concern 
for the prosperity of other people without resentment for their success. Accordingly, 
the altruistic agent enhances his or her efforts if the other agent’s share in his or her 
own performance measure becomes larger, as can be seen from that agent’s 
reaction functions in equation (15). The altruistic agent is therefore willing to bear 
additional effort costs if the other agent’s expected remuneration rises. Bearing that 
in mind, this section examines whether the principal can always profit from an agent’s 
altruistic behavior or if there is a trade-off similar to that observed in the analysis of 
rivalry described above. In the case of altruism, the optimal value of the principal’s 
objective function, which is identical to firm profits, becomes: 
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For one-sided altruism on the part of agent A ( 0,1: == BB nmAE ), this expression 
reduces to: 
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Again, two distinct effects that affect the principal’s profit must be noted: the 
additional weighting factor 10 << Am  in agent A’s contribution describes the intrinsic 
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motivation effect, which, in the case of altruism, leads to a reduction of the principal’s 
profits. This effect occurs only if agent A, as a result of altruism, attaches less 
importance to his or her own wage payments than he or she would if self-interest 
dictated his or her behavior. Increasing Aα  then adds fewer incentives for agent A to 
exhibit greater effort than in the situation of completely selfish behavior. This makes it 
increasingly difficult for the principal to motivate altruistic agent A by means of 
variable wage components. Consequently, the less agent A cares about his or her 
own remuneration, the more that agent’s contribution to firm profits decreases. 
However, it remains unaltered if the weight that agent A, despite his or her altruism, 
attaches to his or her own monetary compensation stays constant. 
The weighting factor 1>
− AA
A
nm
m
 in agent B’s contribution to firm profits 
determines the strength of the extrinsic motivation effect. As stated in section 4.2 the 
principal makes use of agent A’s altruism to enhance agent B’s effort by raising the 
latter’s incentive intensity Bβ . As a result, the more similar the values that agent A 
attaches to his or her own wage payments and those of agent B, the greater the 
increase in firm profits. Taking AA mn → , one obtains 
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which indicates that in the extreme case when the altruistic agent attaches nearly the 
same value to both agents’ profits in his or her own utility function, this could lead to 
a theoretically unlimited increase in firm profits. 
We continue with a two-step analysis of the total effect that one-sided altruism 
has on firm profits: first, we observe that in situations when agent A, despite his or 
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her altruism, attaches constant weight to his or her own wage payments ( 1=Am ), it is 
clear that there are no effects operating in opposite directions and the principal can 
hence always benefit from that agent’s social preference. Thus, the principal’s gains 
increase in proportion to the value that the altruistic agent attaches to the other 
agent’s prosperity with regards to his or her own remuneration. Second, we see that 
negative consequences on the achievement of objectives are likely to occur only 
when altruistic agent A contributes much more to firm profits than selfish agent B. A 
precondition for this, however, is that agent A attaches much less weight to his or her 
own wage payments than he or she would in the case of completely selfish behavior 
( 1<<Am ), and, at the same time, that the relative importance of both agents’ 
compensation does not become too similar ( AA mn << ). On the basis of the above, we 
can reach the following proposition: 
Proposition 2 (Firm Profitability in the Case of One-Sided Altruism): In all cases 
the principal’s profits grow if the altruistic agent attaches greater weight to the other 
(selfish) agent’s wage payments. A negative impact on the principal’s profits can only 
occur in the rare cases where the altruistic agent  
a) contributes more than the selfish one,  
b) simultaneously attaches much less weight to his or her own wage payments 
than he or she would in cases of pure self-interest and 
c) at the same time does not attach the same, or almost the same weight to the 
remuneration of both agents in his or her utility function. 
The current model specifications do not allow us to make general statements 
about whether, from a firm perspective, it is easier to benefit from an agent’s rivalry 
rather than altruism. 
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5.3. The Influence of Two-Sided Homogeneous (Social) 
Preferences on Firm Profits 
In cases of one-sided social preferences it was shown that the principal can usually 
benefit from an agent’s social behavior. The next two sections extend that analysis 
by assuming that both agents exhibit social preferences. First, we examine 
homogeneous social preferences RR  or AA, then we turn to the case of 
heterogeneous social preferences AR . We proceed by breaking down the weighting 
factors in the principal’s optimal goal value that are determined by social preferences 
(see equations [30] and [32]) in order to examine separately each of their 
components. We conclude by an analysis of the total effect.  
First, consider agent A’s weighting factor in the case of two-sided rivalry 
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stems from the reallocation of variable wage compensation components between the 
two agents by the principal because of agent B’s rivalry. As a consequence, agent B 
is favored over agent A. The resulting weakened incentive intensity Aα  for agent A 
leads that agent to reduce his or her effort. However, at the same time, agent A’s 
own ambition to achieve a result that is superior to B’s, which is formally represented 
by the factor ( )Ak+1 , in turn promotes his or her effort. Therefore, in the case of two-
sided social preferences, the extrinsic and the intrinsic motivation effect have a 
mutual impact on each other with regard to firm profits. The second term 
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. Together they form 
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an additional constituent of the intrinsic motivation effect, which exists only in the 
situation of two-sided social preferences. The principal’s reallocation of variable wage 
compensation components as a response to agent B’s rivalry leads share rate Aβ  to 
increase by ( ) A22AABBB
BB
c1r1
1
lkk1
lk
ρσ −+
⋅
++
. Thus, agent B is favored over agent A. In 
its turn, A’s own rivalry prompts him or her to differentiate himself or herself as much 
as possible from agent B in terms of wage compensation. The preferential treatment 
of agent B consequently lowers agent A’s intrinsic motivation, as can be seen from 
the subtrahend A
A
AA
c
lk β−  in agent A’s reaction function (see equation [14]). As a 
result, agent A reduces his or her efforts. This reduction increases not only in both 
agents’ strength of rivalry Ak  and Bk , but also in both agents’ aspiration levels Al  and 
Bl , since higher values of Bl  lead to a further increase in Aβ , to which agent A 
attaches more significance for higher values of Al . 
Before examining the total effect, we shall analyze agent A’s weighting factor 
in the situation of two-sided altruism in equation (32) 
BB
BABA
nm
nnmm
−
−
. Here, the 
minuend 
BB
BA
nm
mm
−
 again consists of an intrinsic as well as an extrinsic motivation 
effect. In this case, however, agent B’s altruism leads to an increase in agent A’s 
incentive intensity Aα , which is reflected in the factor 1>
− BB
B
nm
m
. A’s own altruism, 
however, leads to reduced intrinsic motivation as that agent attaches less importance 
to his or her own wage compensation ( 1<Am ). The subtrahend 
BB
BA
nm
nn
−
−  comprises 
the two components An  and 
BB
B
nm
n
−
− . Because of agent B’s altruism, that agent’s 
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share rate Aβ  is reduced by ( ) AAABB
B
crnm
n
22 11
1
ρσ −+
⋅
−
− , which causes the intrinsic mo-
tivation of agent A to decrease. This effect increases as the importance that agent A, 
due to his own altruism, places on agent B’s wage compensation increases ( ↑An ). 
Insert Figure 7 left and Figure 7 right side-by-side here 
Figure 7: Impact of two-sided rivalry and two-sided altruism on firm profits 
The same factors used in the analysis above can be identified in agent B’s weighting 
factors, ( )( )
AAA
BBAABA
lkk
lklkkk
++
−++
1
11
 and 
AA
BABA
nm
nnmm
−
−
 respectively. To examine the total 
effect, in Figure 7 we depict firm profits as a function of the strength of both agents’ 
homogeneous social preferences in cases of rivalry and in cases of altruism.40 Figure 
7 illustrates that equally developed homogeneous social preferences cannot be 
beneficial from a firm perspective. In either case, firm profits are maximized when 
only one agent has a predisposition, preferably strong, for either rivalry or altruism. 
The intuitive explanation for this result is that the principal can only make use of the 
agents’ social preferences if he or she reacts adequately to their social behavior by 
reallocating variable wage compensation components between the two agents. 
However, the measures that a principal is required to take in response to each 
agent’s social preferences are interdependent. For example, agent A’s rivalry means 
that the principal increases that agent’s share Bα  in agent B’s performance measure 
Bx  at the expense of a reduced incentive intensity Bβ  for B. The stronger the social 
preferences of agent A, the more intense the principal’s response. In this situation, if 
B behaves competitively as well, the principal’s response to agent A’s rivalry 
simultaneously has negative effects not only on agent B’s extrinsic but also on his 
intrinsic motivation. This implies that the principal cannot achieve an advantageous 
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trade-off by means of an adequately designed wage compensation system in a case 
where both agents simultaneously behave competitively. Every reallocation of the 
variable wage compensation components leads to an improvement on one side but, 
at the same time, has a negative effect on the other.  
The same argument holds true for a situation with two-sided altruism. In this 
case, the principal can only profit from each agent’s altruism if he or she increases 
the other agent’s incentive intensity while simultaneously reducing the altruist’s share 
in the same performance measure. This reduction, however, decreases the other 
agent’s intrinsic motivation if he or she also behaves altruistically. Therefore, the 
positive effects of the heightened incentive intensity are partly wasted. Again, the 
reallocation of the variable wage compensation components that has been caused by 
one agent’s altruism has negative effects on the other agent if he or she exhibits the 
same degree of altruism, since neither agent wants to be privileged over the other. In 
both cases, the principal’s actions in response to each of the agents’ social 
preferences contradict one another, which means that the principal cannot benefit 
from the behavior that results from those actions if the social preferences of both 
agents are of equal strength.41 This analysis leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3 (Firm Profitability in the Case of Two-Sided Homogeneous Social 
Preferences): If agents are endowed with the same characteristics, firm profits are 
the same independently of the agents’ types of preferences. From a firm’s point of 
view, in such cases there is no advantage of social over selfish preferences. On the 
contrary, compared to the case of pure self-interest, here firm profits are higher if 
only one of the two agents exhibits a particular social preference (either altruism or 
rivalry), preferably to a high degree, while the other behaves in a purely selfish 
manner.  
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However, higher aspiration levels Al  and Bl  always lead to reduced effort on 
the part of both agents and therefore have a negative impact on firm profitability. This 
suggests that when agents have high expectations of their personal performances, 
this can actually have a negative effect on their output, because it may undermine 
employee satisfaction. Therefore, from a firm’s point of view, agents with low 
aspiration levels are generally more productive and hence more beneficial for the 
firm. If the principal could choose which agent should exhibit social preferences, 
ideally it would be the agent who also exhibits smaller marginal costs, smaller risk 
aversion and a less variable performance measure. This agent would make a larger 
contribution to firm profits, even in the case of purely selfish behavior, and this effect 
would be further amplified by the principal’s reallocation of variable wage 
compensation components as a response to the agents’ social preferences. 
5.4. The Profitability of Two-Sided Heterogeneous Social 
Preferences for the Firm 
In the previous analysis, firm profits reached their maximum level when only one 
agent had a predisposition, preferably a strong one, for either rivalry or altruism, and 
the homogeneous social preference of the other agent was zero, meaning that the 
second agent was completely selfish. Here we examine whether firm profitability can 
be further enhanced if the two agents exhibit heterogeneous social preferences. The 
principal’s optimal objective function value takes the form: 
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We begin by breaking down the various effects contained in the weighting factors 
( )
BBB
BBABA
lkk
lknkm
++
++
1
1
 (agent A) and ( )
AA
BBABA
nm
lknkm
−
++1
 (agent B) then go on to consider 
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their combined impact on firm profits. The weighting factor in the contribution of the 
altruistic agent A in (35) has two components. The first term ( )
BBB
BA
lkk
km
++
+
1
1
 can be 
broken down into two subcomponents, Am  and 
BBB
B
lkk
k
++
+
1
1
. As a result of agent B’s 
rivalry, the principal shifts variable wage compensation away from A and toward B. 
Thus, A’s incentive intensity Aα  is reduced by the factor 11
1
<
++
+
BBB
B
lkk
k
. This 
negative extrinsic motivation effect, which lowers the effort of agent A, is reinforced 
by A’s altruism if that agent attaches less weight to his or her own monetary 
incentives ( 1<Am ). Overall, the first component of agent A’s weighting factor has a 
negative impact on firm profits. 
The second term 
BBB
BBA
lkk
lkn
++1
 reflects an intrinsic motivation effect. Because 
of agent B’s rivalry, Aβ , which denotes how closely agent B’s payments are linked to 
agent A’s performance measure Ax , takes higher values than in the case of pure 
self-interest. This results in higher intrinsic motivation for the altruistic agent A. In 
other words, due to the increase in Aβ , agent A’s actions not only affect his or her 
own wage payments positively, but also increase those of agent B, to whom agent A 
attributes the improvement of his or her own financial situation as compared to the 
case of pure self-interest. Therefore, the more agent A takes agent B’s wage 
payments into consideration ( ↑An ), the more willing he or she is to bear higher costs 
and make a greater effort. Thus, the second term affects firm profits positively. 
The weighting factor in the contribution of the competitive agent B in (35) 
also has two components. The first part ( )
AA
BA
nm
km
−
+1
 is made of two subcomponents. 
The factor ( )Bk+1  depicts an intrinsic motivation effect for agent B. Spurred by rivalry, 
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agent B wants to be as far ahead of agent A as possible. The principal exploits this 
ambitious behavior. Simultaneously, Bβ  is increased by the factor 1>
− AA
A
nm
m
 
because of agent A’s altruism, which leads the principal to increase the direct 
incentive intensity for agent B. This further enhances agent B’s (extrinsic) motivation. 
The second part 
AA
BBA
nm
lkn
−
 describes the intrinsic motivation effect for agent B. 
Agent A’s altruism ties his or her wage payments negatively to agent B’s 
performance measure Bx  ( 0<Bα ). Therefore, A’s rewards decrease as agent B 
enhances his or her efforts. This means that in such a situation competitive agent B 
draws additional utility from his or her own efforts, as can be seen from the 
mathematical expression B
B
BB
c
lk
α−  in agent B’s reaction function (see equation [14]). 
As a consequence, both agent B’s willingness to perform well and the firm’s profits 
increase. 
To examine the total effect, we consider the dependence of firm profits on the 
strength of altruism An  as well as the strength of rivalry Bk  (Figure 8).42 For the sake 
of simplicity, it is again assumed that the weighting factors in agent A’s utility 
function, An  and Am , sum up to 0.1 . Figure 8 shows that firm profits are maximized 
when agent A behaves as altruistically as possible while agent B simultaneously 
exhibits a well-developed sense of rivalry. 
Insert Figure 8 here 
Figure 8: The dependence of firm profits on agent A’s strength of altruism An  and agent B’s strength 
of rivalry Bk  
This is because agent B’s rivalry encourages the reduction of agent A’s 
variable wage payments while at the same time enhancing agent B’s own 
compensation. The altruistic agent A partly internalizes this external effect by drawing 
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satisfaction from the fact that agent B receives higher remuneration. Thus, the 
principal’s measure to privilege B in order to make use of his or her rivalry 
simultaneously enhances the utility of altruistic agent A, who attributes to B the 
improvement of his or her own situation. At the same time, as a result of agent A’s 
altruism, the principal reallocates variable wage compensation components between 
the decentralized divisions in favor of B and at the expense of A. This action is in 
agent B’s interest whose rivalry prompts him or her to distinguish him- or herself as 
much as possible from agent A in terms of wage compensation. Therefore, the prin-
cipal’s countermeasures, which aim at balancing the two agents’ social preferences, 
are complementary. The relation between the weighting factors is described by 
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 (36) 
meaning that firm profits are in relative terms more enhanced by the agent who 
behaves competitively. It follows that from a firm perspective, it is advantageous if the 
altruistic agent is the one who, in the case of completely selfish behavior, would 
make a smaller contribution to firm profits. Proposition 4 summarizes the previous 
discussion: 
Proposition 4 (Firm Profitability in the Case of Two-Sided Heterogeneous 
Social Preferences): For the principal, the optimal combination of types in his or her 
team is that where the agents are as diverse as possible in terms of social 
preferences. If additional asymmetries between the agents exist, it is most desirable 
that the agent who behaves altruistically exhibits higher risk aversion, higher 
marginal effort costs and a more volatile performance measure. 
This proposition, like the previous ones, relies on the assumptions that 
separate performance measures for each of the two agents are available and that the 
principal can observe their (social) preferences. 
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6. Implications and Further Research 
The question of whether new insights gained in experimental decision theory and 
neuroscience can have an impact on economic theories is an important issue of 
modern research. In this paper, we analyzed the influence of various social 
preferences on the incentive system in a decentralized organization, taking into 
account that in reality not all people behave completely selfishly. Unlike other 
research in the field, in this paper we also took altruism into account. Thus, this study 
considers three widespread types of preferences (rivalry, pure self-interest and 
altruism) and the differences between them. Furthermore, it provides evidence for the 
importance of internal and external conditions in providing incentives and shaping 
agent behavior and ultimately firm profits. In particular, we have shown how 
environmental stochastic dependences, which may be caused by market cycles or 
other external conditions, influence the principal’s provision of incentives. These are 
crucial to the outcome of our analysis of the impact of social preferences on the 
profitability of the firm. Our study makes clear that the impact of social preferences 
interacts with stochastic dependences. As a result, the principal’s share parameters 
fulfill overlapping functions, which may affect the optimality of different types of 
remuneration. For the sake of simplicity, the influence of internal dependences, in the 
shape of technological dependences, has been excluded from this paper.  In order to 
optimize the wage compensation system, the principal must react to the agents’ 
preferences by shifting the shares in performance measures that each of the two 
agents receives and thus reallocating their variable wage compensation components. 
Our analysis shows that when such a reallocation takes place the different functions 
that the parameters of the incentive system have must be balanced. 
A central result of our paper is the insight that a firm may increase its profit by 
adjusting compensation. Both altruism and rivalry entail intrinsic motivation, which 
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can be exploited by the principal, although the altruism of agents is not inherently 
advantageous. This seems surprising at first glance; however, what makes possible 
an increase in profits lies in the differences between the preferences of various 
agents and in the strength of those preferences. A principal, and therefore a firm, can 
make use of these differences in cases of rivalry as well as of altruism. In the case of 
rivalry, this is related to the motivating effects of competition, which can be seen in 
several areas of social interaction, including economics and sports. In the case of 
altruism, the firm does not need to pay all agents equally in order to motivate them, 
as it would in a situation where all agents exhibited pure self-interest. Therefore, 
incentives can be partly shifted toward the selfish or competitive agent who in 
consequence invests higher effort. This important result indicates that firms, being 
hierarchically structured organizations, have a chance to exploit intrinsic motivation 
by combining agents with different social preferences and optimizing the wage 
compensation system. 
The insight that differences in preferences can be profitable and hence can be 
“managed” by a firm is not only relevant to the issue of wage compensation, but also 
indicates that ethical aspects should be considered in problems of economics as well 
as business administration.43 These results are important in determining 
organizational structure, the distribution of tasks and decision authority within a firm, 
the selection of the right personnel to fill management positions as well as of the 
members of business teams including the company’s board. In sum, we could say 
that since preferences determine human behavior to a high degree, different types of 
preferences may affect many aspects of a firm. 
A significant, and perhaps unexpected, result of our analysis is that a group of 
people who share equally competitive or altruistic preferences is usually not more 
efficient than a team composed of members with only selfish preferences and less 
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efficient than a team composed of members with different preferences. In our model, 
a firm maximizes its profit when the agents it employs exhibit the greatest possible 
difference in their (social) preferences. This result raises two questions. First, should 
firms combine persons with extremely different social preferences in their (project) 
teams and employ them as managers of decentralized divisions? Second, to what 
degree can such a policy be realized? Answers to these questions should take the 
prerequisites of our theoretical model into account, namely (a) that as many 
performance measures as agents are available and (b) that the principal can observe 
to some extent his or her agents’ (social) preferences. Another point is that our main 
result conflicts with the intuitive notion, which is supported by some empirical 
research,44 that teams with identical preferences seem to be most successful in 
specific areas or situations. 
All of the aspects discussed above indicate that further research is needed to 
analyze the relevance and practicability of the assumptions examined here. For 
example, it seems important that we use a theoretical model without imposing limited 
liability constraints which is used in conjunction with the assumption that a firm can 
use very different compensation parameters for each of the two types of agents. The 
last point contradicts principles of equal treatment in compensation, which calls for 
empirical research on e.g. the distribution of (social) preferences in companies, their 
determinants and their stability. The degree to which moral ideas and principles of 
equality, justice, etc., influence behavior in firms and therefore limit the design of 
wage compensation systems should also be examined. Additionally, our results need 
to be scrutinized through empirical investigation to identify in which areas and to what 
degree firms can use differences in personal preferences to increase their profits. 
To conclude we could say that, in reality, people may be driven by a mixture of 
competitive, selfish and altruistic motives. Assuming that selfish preferences always 
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prevail is certainly a simplification of real-life behavior. Nevertheless, if we define self-
interest as the mean between envy and altruism, which represent extreme types of 
behavior, this assumption may on average yield satisfactory results. At the same 
time, this assumption may not be correct in all cases. Behavioral science research 
has been increasingly revealing differences in people’s choices and providing 
insights into the circumstances under which different preferences are reflected in 
personal behavior. Such insights should also increasingly be taken into consideration 
in future theoretical and empirical research in the fields of economics and business 
administration. 
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Appendix 
A. Derivation of the optimal values for the share rates in a situation 
which includes rivalry and moral hazard 
Solving the participation constraints for 0α , 0β  and plugging the resulting values 
together with the expressions for a , b  (equation [14]) in the principal’s utility function 
(4) yields his optimization problem: 
where 
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Partial differentiation with respect to the four share rates Aα , Aβ , Bα , Bβ  provides 
the first-order conditions, which, after some rearranging, can be written as: 
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Condition 2: 0=
∂
∂
B
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α
 
Condition 3: 0=
∂
∂
A
PU
β  
Condition 4: 0=
∂
∂
B
PU
β  
Having rearranged and simplified the first-order conditions to some extent, solved 
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equation (A.4) for Bα  and plugged the resulting expression into equation (A.6) we 
get: 
Solving equation (A.5) for Bα  and plugging the resulting expression into equation 
(A.7) yields: 
After rearranging and simplification, solving equation (A.4) for Aα  and plugging the 
resulting expression into equation (A.6) leads to: 
Solving equation (A.5) for Aα  and plugging the resulting expression into equation 
(A.7) yields in its turn: 
Equating the expressions for Aα  in (A.8) and (A.9) leads to the mathematical 
relation: 
Accordingly, equating the expressions for Bα  in (A.10) and (A.11) yields: 
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Solving (A.12) for Aβ  and plugging the resulting expression into (A.13) delivers, after 
some further rearranging and simplification, the optimal value of share rate Bβ : 
Plugging this expression into (A.12) leads to the optimal value of share rate Aβ : 
Substituting the expressions (A.14) and (A.15) for Bβ  and Aβ  in the mathematical 
relations (A.8) and (A.11) delivers the optimal values for the share rates Aα  and Bα : 
B. Calculation of the principal’s optimal goal function value in a situation 
of rivalry 
 
We calculate the maximum value of the objective function by plugging the optimal 
values for the share rates (see equations [17]–[22]) into the principal’s goal function 
(A.1). The expressions in front of the risk terms yield: 
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Agent A’s risk term can be simplified to: 
Analogously, one obtains for agent B’s risk term: 
Consolidating the partial expressions (A.18)–(A.20), after some rearranging yields: 
After some further manipulations, one finally obtains the expression given in the main 
text: 
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